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The Government’s plans for a “Northern Powerhouse” and the associated moves towards greater policy autonomy
for Greater Manchester are combining to create a potential situation where MPs in Manchester and areas which
may also in future enjoy similar powers can vote on matters which don’t effect their constituents. This, argue Andy
Mycock and Arianna Giovannini represents the advent of the “Manchester Withington Question” – a deliberate
echo of the “West Lothian Question”, which the government’s new English Votes for English Laws reform seeks to
answer.
Morning in Withington (Credit: chiptooth, CC BY 2.0)
Reform of the constitutional architecture of the UK state over the past two decades has adhered to a conservative
orthodoxy based on an enduring belief in the British Political Tradition whereby the redistribution of power has been
negotiated between state and sub-state national and regional elites rather than with the British people. As a result,
the process of devolution has proven largely unplanned, piecemeal, and pragmatic, an open-ended process that
lacks clarity in terms of its purpose, procedure, or extent. The introduction of English Votes for English Laws (EVEL)
conforms to this approach, as does the current government’s programme of devolution within England.
Proponents of EVEL argue it has been devised as a means to address the so-called ‘West Lothian’ Question whose
principal anomaly concerns voting asymmetries within the House of Commons whereby MPs from outside of
England are able to vote on matters that affect only England, while MPs from England are unable to vote on matters
that have been devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. The
case for EVEL appears to be founded upon the view that the natural equilibrium, long understood to successfully
balance the parliamentary constitution of Westminster, has been profoundly undermined by unequal and unfair
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programmes of devolution undertaken by successive UK governments. It is contended that EVEL will rebalance UK
multi-national governance and restore constitutional stability by limiting votes on parliamentary bills in Westminster
that relate to England alone to English constituency MPs. This will in effect allow Westminster to act as parliament
both to the UK and England.
However, the extension of bespoke, elite-controlled reform to England is likely to fuel constitutional instability across
the UK state, further Anglicising the House of Commons (and by association the House of Lords) while also
necessitating a further reordering of the UK civil service. Moreover, EVEL does not engage with on-going reforms in
the other nations of the UK nor within England, appearing designed to operate in parallel, rather than in tandem,
with other policies such as devolution to England’s cities and regions and the wider Northern Powerhouse agenda.
EVEL’s singular focus on the constitutional anomaly related to the current imbalanced representation of England’s
national voice within the UK means it overlooks the way that English national, regional, and local policy-making and
governance are interconnected.
Crucially, current approaches to devolution via bespoke city regions and other territorial deals will create
asymmetries in policy remit amongst MPs in different parts of England that resemble the very ‘West Lothian
Question’ that EVEL is supposed to put to rest. For example, the development of ‘Devo-Manc’ over the past year or
so has devolved responsibility for some or all provision of health, social care, employment and training, and
transport to the Greater Manchester Combined Authority. As a result, the MPs in Greater Manchester, such as Jeff
Smith who was elected for the first time in the Manchester Withington constituency, will no longer be directly
responsible, accountable or able to influence formulation and delivery for these areas in Westminster. Mr Smith will
however be able to continue to vote on some or all of these policy areas in other English MPs constituencies where
responsibility has not yet been devolved. As such, many of the anomalies associated with the ‘West Lothian
Question’ could be reproduced within England through what might be described as the ‘Manchester Withington
Question’.
Some argue against the proposition that the ‘West Lothian Question’ could be replicated within England. Perhaps
contrary to what many members of the public believe, it is pointed out that all of the powers so far devolved in
England belong to and are mandated by the executive branch of the UK government and are not the product of new
legislation introduced via votes in the House of Commons. It is argued that as EVEL only applies to matters that are
voted on in the House of Commons, it doesn’t apply to government and executive decisions. This point has merit but
understates somewhat the interconnections and overlaps between parliamentary bills and government/executive
decision-making. For instance, there is an explicit relationship between the current Cities and Local Devolution Bill,
whose passage through Westminster would be affected by the introduction of EVEL, and the government’s on-going
programme of English devolution.
Mark Sandford has argued that, unlike the devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, English
city-regions have not yet been given sufficient powers to pass either primary or secondary legislation. Put simply,
there will be no ‘Mancunian laws’ designed and implemented by the Greater Manchester directly-elected mayor or
the cabinet comprised of the ten council leaders of the combined authority. Sanford rightly notes that – at present –
asymmetric regional devolution would therefore not lead to any restrictions on MPs’ ability to vote on English-only
matters in the House of Commons.
This situation would however be altered if the UK government devolved powers to allow regional variation in
taxation rates and fiscal policy-making. Recent policy announcements indicate that the government is willing to
countenance regional and local asymmetry in taxation. The devolution of responsibilities to set and collect business
rates in England announced in October 2015 will allow local authorities to cut these rates while only elected mayors
in London, Manchester, Sheffield and other city-regions will be allowed to increase them. It is likely that as further
fiscal powers are devolved, demands from local and regional for secondary legislation powers will gain currency.
However, there is more to the ‘Manchester Withington Question’ in reality than that issue of parliamentary principle.
It is likely the ‘Manchester Withington Question’ will encourage deterioration of relations between MPs within the
2/3
House of Commons as asymmetries in the remit and influence of English elected-representatives intensify.
Resentments will coalesce on questions of funding and resource allocation, policy design and delivery, and the
coherence and uniformity of welfare and other public services. National, regional, and local cleavages within and
between union-wide political parties will also escalate and solidify. MPs will be increasingly placed in a position
where they must compete for authority and influence with newly-empowered local-regional elites. The Greater
Manchester city-deals provide a good snapshot of this nascent ‘politics of new English regionalism’, with some
Labour MPs publicly raising concerns about the process, transparency and democratic-accountability of ‘Devo-
Manc’.
Emerging arenas of contestation will likely be driven by territorialism and identity that will redefine the tone and tenor
of political debate both within the House of Commons and in local constituencies. However, the ‘Manchester
Withington Question’ is likely to prove even more complex than its ‘West Lothian’ counterpart. The Conservative
government is currently in the process of agreeing uneven and bespoke deals across England with no consistency
in the nature or extent of the devolution of powers. This means that English MPs will have their responsibilities
cauterised to differing extents, further undermining the national consistency of EVEL. The government’s urgency in
introducing EVEL denies England the time afforded Scotland to debate and vote on its constitutional future. The lack
of a strategic and coherent vision of the extent of devolution across the UK and within England is therefore likely to
not only increase competition and conflict between an ever more Anglicised Westminster and the other nations of
the UK but also with English regions and localities.
So, behold the Manchester Withington Question. It will require an answer.
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